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Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-
Implications for Domestic Law-A European
Perspective
JOST DELBROCK*
The international system after the end of the Cold War has become
vastly more complex in structure, tasks, and perceptions on the part of the
old and the new international actors. Processes of globalization and
internationalization as well as strong countervailing forces of old and new
nationalisms are but three major facets of this new vexing complexity. If
one sets out to assess the implications of the globalization of law, politics,
and markets for domestic law and its adaptation to the new situation in the
United States, in European countries or within the European Community
(EC), one must have a rather precise picture of what globalization of the
respective subjects actually means, where it happens, and to what extent.
It is also necessary, however, to put the phenomenon of globalization into
proper historic perspective in order to understand the causes and forces
leading to processes of globalization within the international setting.
Thus this paper will deal with the new complexities of the international
system and, specifically, with aspects of globalization, in three steps. Part
one will elaborate on the notion of globalization and on the international
setting in which it does or does not take place. Part two will describe and
analyze some of the strategies, mechanisms, and instruments applied in the
process of globalization in the areas of trade and the environment within the
frameworks of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and, of
course, the EC.' The third and final section will try to draw some
conclusions from the preceding analysis. It will also try to give some
* Professor of German Constitutional Law, International Law, and European Community Law,
Christian-Albrechts-Universitdt, Kiel, Germany; Visiting Professor of International and European
Community Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. Dr.iur.habil, Kiel, 1971; LL.M.,
Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, 1960. For valuable advice on the economic aspects of
this paper, I am indebted to Christopher Delbrick.
1. Interesting contributions to the globalization of markets are also made by the International
Labour Organization (ILO) and the Council of Europe, particularly in the field of promoting the
movement of workers. Since the paper focuses specifically on trade and the environment, the ILO and
Council of Europe experiences are not dealt with here.
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tentative answers as to where and how the process of globalization of law,
politics, and markets asks for changes or reforms in the domestic legal
orders and will ask for a modification of traditional nation-state centered
perceptions of international political, economic, and legal transactions in the
United States and EC Member States.
I. COUNTERVAILING FORCES: GLOBALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION
AND RENATIONALIZATION-THE INTERNATIONAL SETTIING
A. Globalization Defined
For more than a century an increasing number of domestic or national
matters have become "internationalized," i.e., made the subject of bi- or
multilateral cooperation, mostly in an institutionalized framework, a process
which, in a wider sense, could be called internationalization.2 In the more
recent past, however, the term globalization has entered into the vocabulary
of scholars as well as political practitioners.' Although it seems, at times,
as if the new term is rather carelessly used as a trendy synonym for the
word "internationalization," such interpretation of the term "globalization"
would fall short of its distinct meaning. For instance, certain serious threats
to the environment such as ozone layer depletion or climate change caused
by the so-called "greenhouse effect" are of global rather than international
concern since they affect humankind everywhere, regardless of national
boundaries. Similarly, today's financial markets are globalizing rather than
internationalizing (which they did in earlier decades) since, for instance, the
movement of capital has largely become independent of the sovereign
control of state agencies.' Thus, it seems that globalization as distinct from
2. This term in international law originally had a narrower meaning, see Rridiger Wolfrum,
Internationalization, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (Rudolf Bernhardt et
al. eds., 1987). For a historically-oriented account of the process of internationalization in the broader
sense, see GEORG DAHM, JOST DELBROCK, AND RODIGER WOLFRUM, V6LKERRECHT (1989).
3. As early as 1943, Wendell Willkie touched upon the notion of globalization in a farsighted
book. WENDELL L. WILLKIE, ONE WORLD (1943). However, the term has become "common coin" after
influential institutions such as the Club of Rome called attention to the global challenges posed by the
ecological crisis. See, e.g., DENNIS L. MEADOWS, ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH; A REPORT FOR THE
CLUB OF ROME'S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND (1972); GERALD 0. BARNEY, COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (1981). For a perceptive analysis of processes of globalization of international policies, see
Dieter Senghaas, Weltinnenpolitik-Ansdtze fir ein Konzept, 47 EUROPA ARCHIV 643, 643-52 (1992).
4. Professor Bruce Markell pointedly observed this trend, Remarks at the Interdisciplinary
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internationalization denotes a process of denationalization of clusters of
political, economic and social activities. Internationalization, on the other
hand, refers to cooperative activities of national actors, public or private, on
a level beyond the nation-state but in the last resort under its control.
Another difference between the two notions is that internationalization
serves as a supplement to the nation-state's efforts to satisfy the needs of its
people, i.e., the national interest. On the other hand, at least ideally,
globalization is to serve the common good of humankind, e.g., the
preservation of a viable environment or the provision of general economic
and social welfare. In this sense, globalization is a normative concept since
it is related to a value judgement, i.e., that the common good is to be served
by measures that are to be subsumed under the notion of globalization. At
the same time, one has to realize that globalization also signifies a factual
process based on the dynamics of, for instance, the markets.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, globalization as understood
here may be defined as the process of denationalization of markets, laws and
politics in the sense of interlacing peoples and individuals for the sake of the
common good. Internationalization, on the other hand, may be defined as
a means to enable nation-states to satisfy the national interest in areas where
they are incapable of doing so on their own. A short survey of the
evolution of the international system during the last century will show that
the two processes can be identified as consecutive stages in the development
of the international system. But such a survey will also reveal that
globalization and internationalization are still met by strong countervailing
forces of old and new nationalisms with the result that neither
internationalization nor globalization may be understood as exclusive and
dominant characteristics of the present international system. Particularly,
globalization is neither a universal process nor is the concept universally
applied. Nor is globalization involving all states and regions alike, nor is
it global in the sense that all major aspects of political, economic, or social
life are actually encompassed by the process.
Conference on the Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets: Implications for Domestic Law Reform
Celebrating the 150th Anniversary of the Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington (March 4-7,
1993).
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B. Countervailing Forces: Renationalization vs. Internationalization
The international community has been witnessing one of the most
profound upheavals in the international system since the breakdown of the
old Eurocentric order after World War I. The seemingly stable bipolar
power structure dominating the post-World War II order, reinforced by or
based on the ideological division between the Soviet-led Socialist camp and
the western world, has vanished. The apocalyptic threat of nuclear
annihilation of most of the "civilized world" has become remote or even
eliminated altogether. Yet the international system is far from entering the
millenium of perpetual peace, general welfare, and universal observance of
human rights. On the contrary, although a number of serious regional
conflicts have been eased in the wake of the end of the Cold War, other
grave conflicts, such as in the Near East, persist with unpredictable
implications for international peace and security. In addition, a host of new,
rather vicious conflicts have surfaced, e.g., ethnonationalist struggles for
political and religious self-determination as in the former Soviet Union and
in the former Yugoslavia, but not confined to these areas.5 The causes of
these violent struggles have partially historical roots, but they are also
indicative of a new phenomenon that will have a strong impact on the future
development of the international, nation-state based system.
Ethnonationalism has reemerged after the breakdown of the overarching
power structures that suppressed long standing ethnonationalist antagonisms.
But today's ethnonationalism has another, modern dimension to it. As
people worldwide have become more politically conscious and, therefore,
less ready to accept public authority as such, they are turning to measures
of "self-help," violently if necessary, and to religiously (mostly
fundamentalist) based group identification. As a result we see the
international system confronted with a fast-growing diversity of political
actors-new states and nations striving to become states-who are highly
politicized and suspicious of public authority whether international or
national. Tendencies of renationalization can also be observed even within
5. On the character and causes of the new ethnonationalism, see Dieter Senghaas, Vom Nutzen
und Elend der Nationalismen im Leben von Vilkern, B31-32 AUS POLITIK UND
ZEITGESCHICHTE-BEILAGE ZUR WOCHENZEITUNG DAS PARLAMENT 3 (1992). See also David Hamburg,
Ethnische Konflikte-Ursachen, Eskalation undPrdventive Vermittlung, 48 EUROPA ARCHIV 117 (1993);
Peter Coulmas, Das Problem des Selbstbestimmungsrechts: Mikronationalismen, Anarchie und innere
Schwiichen der Staaten, 48 EUROPA ARCHIV 85 (1993).
[Vol. 1: 9
1993] GLOBALIZATION OF LAW, POLITICS, AND MARKETS 13
well-institutionalized frameworks of supranational cooperation such as the
EC. 6
On the other hand, the network of international organizations that was
set up in the late nineteenth century and that have continuously grown in
numbers and scope of competence,' has largely remained intact. In fact, the
central international organization, the United Nations (U.N.), has been
revitalized as a result of the end of the Cold War. It is well worth
remembering that international organizations have their raison d'itre in the
fact that states realized their structural inability as independent entities to
satisfy the economic and security needs of theirsocieties in a time that was
characterized by dramatic technological and social change.' International
organizations reflect the international community's resolve to take on
international responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, the protection of human rights, economic and social welfare,
international communication in the widest sense,9 and cultural exchange.
However, with the exception of the recent and so far unique phenomenon
of supranational cooperation within the EC, exercising international
responsibility in the fields named above remained, at least defacto, nation-
state oriented. The decision-making rules continued to be based on the
principle of sovereignty. Institutionalized international cooperation was
perceived as an instrument to supplement national governments where they
were unable to fulfill the domestic needs of their people, not as a means of
serving the international community at large. States came to think
internationally to a certain extent, but neither they nor nongovernmental
actors had yet begun to think globally.
6. The changed attitudes of the electorates in Denmark, France, and Germany toward greater
integration of the EC into a union with a common currency are indicative of this trend of cherishing
national sovereignty; see the report on the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and public
opinion polls in the other states named, Craig R. Whitney, Europe's Muted Joy, and Its Misgivings, N.Y.
TIMES, September 21, 1992, at Al, A8. The Danish electorate, which has rejected ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty by a small margin, may come out in favor of the Treaty after some modifications
accomodating Danish anxieties, but the majority again will most likely be marginal.
7. DAHM, supra note 2, at 13-14.
8. Id. at 11-13.
9. Jost Delbrtick, International Communications and National Sovereignty: Means and Scope
of National Control Over International Communications (Sea, Land and Air Traffic,
Telecommunications), 15 THESAURUS ACROASIUM 77 (1987); see also CHARLES HENRY
ALEXANDROWITZ, THE LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATION (1971). On the globalization of information
policies and its impact on domestic law, see Fred Cate, Global Information Policymaking and Domestic
Law, I INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming April 1994).
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C. Entering the Era of Globalization: Causes and Forces
However, the post-World War II era saw a gradual change. It is not by
chance that the United Nations was empowered to take binding decisions
against aggressor states under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, a rather
dramatic move away from the pre-war credo of state sovereignty.'0 The
global experience of the devastating effects of modem warfare, including the
first uses of atomic weapons, induced the international community to rethink
the century-old concept of state sovereignty. The international community
began to realize that international peace and security had become not only
an international responsibility, but a universal or global responsibility and
they limited the principle of state sovereignty accordingly. The East-West
confrontation tended to cloud this historic shift of focus, but with the end
of the Cold War the new perception has become more clearly visible. It has
become reinforced for a number of reasons, which follow.
1. Global Threats to Peace and Security
Although the threat of nuclear annihilation as a result of a nuclear
exchange between the Superpowers is remote today, universal peace and
security are still in jeopardy. Some nuclear blackmail, that resulting from
uncontrolled-and possibly uncontrollable-proliferation, grave
environmental pollution as a means of warfare (the weapon of the world's
disenfranchised), and severe ethnonationalist conflicts," can no longer be
perceived of in traditional terms of international security policies.
2. The Global Challenge of Underdevelopment and Poverty
The impoverishment of a large segment of the international community
due to underdevelopment that had already been recognized in the so-called
North-South dimension, has become a global problem of the first order.
10. RICHARD HISCOCKS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL: A STUDY IN ADOLESCENCE 55-56 (1973);
see Jost Delbrfick, Commentary on Article 25 no. 1, in CHARTA DER VEREINTEN
NATIONEN-KOMMENTAR 375 (B. Simma ed., 1991).
l1. The new dimensions of future international peace policies are clearly set out in An Agenda
for-Peace: Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR 47th Sess.,
Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. a/47/277 (1992); see also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Friedenserhaltung durch
die Vereinten Nationen: Eine neue Chance fir den Welt/rieden, 48 Europa Archiv 123 (1993).
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After the breakdown of the Soviet empire, underdevelopment has now also
become a West-East phenomenon. Underdevelopment and increasing
impoverishment of a great number of peoples start right at the Eastern
borders of Central Europe.
3. Global Threats to the Environment
With the overriding concern for the maintenance of international peace
between the two major alliance systems under the leadership of the United
States and the Soviet Union removed, the international community is
gradually recognizing the existential threats to the survival of "Spaceship
Earth" posed by the increasing destruction of the human environment.
Ozone layer depletion, global warming, water pollution, soil and
groundwater pollution, and vast land areas radiated by nuclear waste have
reached dimensions that transcend the capabilities of not only individual
states but also regional organizations to cope with these threats. The above
problems pose global threats. The close interrelation of environmental
destruction and underdevelopment adds to the global scope of these
problems.
4. The Global Challenge of Mass Migration
As a result of impoverishment, environmental destruction, and in a great
number of cases ethnonationalist conflicts, a fourth problem of global
dimension has emerged-mass migration. Intracontinental and
transcontinental migration have become worldwide phenomena that cannot
be dealt with adequately in terms of refugee relief programs, granting
asylum, or other traditional instruments of temporary applicability.
Conservative estimates of the present migrations maintain that they are still
only the proverbial tip of the iceberg. 2
12. On the phenomenon of the new mass migrations, see Eberhard Jahn, Migration Movements
8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 377, 378-79 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 1987) (with
further references to earlier comprehensive works on the subject). For shorter accounts of recent
developments in migration movements, see GLOBALE TRENDS. DATEN ZUR WELTENTWICKLUNG UND
FRIEDEN (Stiftung zur Entwicklung und Frieden ed., 1991); Albert Miihlum, ARMuTSWANDERUNG, ASYL
UND ABWEHRVERHALTEN. GLOBALE UND NATIONALE DILEMMATA, B/7 Aus POLigK ND
ZEITGESCHICHTE BEILAGE ZUR WOCHENZEITUNG DAS PARLAMENT 3 (1993); Clemens Geiltler, Neue
Vdlkerwanderungen in Europa, 47 EUROPA ARCHLY 566 (1993).
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One certainly realizes that the preceding list of factors covers only the
dark side of the matter. Despite, or rather because of this, the list
enumerates factors that contribute strongly to a globalization of perceptions
and that call for what E.v.Weizsdicker has termed "Erdpolitik" (earth
policy), 3 or what this author prefers to call "Weltinnenpolitik" (world
interior policy), a term I borrowed from C.F.v.Weizsdicker.' 4 But it is also
evident that the process of globalization with regard to the issues named
largely occurs on the level of adhortation rather than in fact. Treated below
are the instances where globalization in the areas named has already entered
the stage of realization, e.g., in the form of conventional international law
(climate convention, ozone layer protection convention, ecological trade
regulation) and its impact on domestic law, politics, and markets. 5
The question remains where else and to what extent globalization has
entered the real world of actual implementation. A fifth set of factors has
contributed to a process of actual globalization, i.e., to the establishment of
international and to some extent global (or denationalized) markets.
5. Globalizing Forces in the Markets
The grand vision of an international economic order based on the
principles of nondiscrimination and free trade backed by the foundation of
an International Trade Organization, as enunciated at the Bretton Woods
Conference, was never realized. 16 However, the pragmatic implementation
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 17 together with the
establishment of the World Bank,'8 the International Monetary Fund
13. See ERNST VON WEIZSACKER, ERDPOLITIK---OKOLOGISCHE REALPOLITIK AN DER SCHWELLE
ZUM JAHRHUNDERT DER UMWELT, (3d ed. 1992).
14. See Carl Friedrich Freiherr von Weizsicker, Das ethische Problem der modernen Strategie,
24 EUROPA ARCHIV 183 (1969); see also Senghaas, supra note 5.
15. See discussion infra part II.C.
16. For a summary account of the history of the Bretton Woods system and GAIT, see
Wolfgang Benedek, GA TT-Allgemeines Zoll--und Handelsabkommen, in HANDBUCH DER VEREINTEN
NATIONEN 201-02, (Rildiger Wolfrum ed. 1991); see also Giinther Jaenicke, General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds.,
1987).
17. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; Protocol of
Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
18. Amendment to Article III of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 16, 1945, 606 U.N.T.S. 294; Articles of Agreement for the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
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(IMF),' 9 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)2 0 has contributed to the foundations of an international economic
order. This order now also forms the basis of the ongoing globalization of
the economic order.2' But besides the basic framework of a
nondiscriminatory and free-trade oriented economic order, additional factors
were necessary to start the process of globalization of markets, politics, and
law. These factors are to be found in the technological evolution, or rather,
revolution, of transnational communication. The rapid advancement of air
traffic has brought the economic community closer together than ever
before. But much more importantly, the telecommunications revolution has
truly globalized international markets, particularly financial markets. What
happens at the Tokyo stock market is of instantaneous relevance in
Frankfurt, London, and-with little delay-in New York. The movement
of capital, once a matter of weeks or days, occurs in a matter of seconds
today. A domestic decision on interest rates in many cases immediately
affects trade policies worldwide. This momentous acceleration of market
transactions does not only amount to quantitative time savings; it is actually
changing the market and the agents' behavior qualitatively. A third factor
contributing to the globalization of markets, closely linked to the high
international mobility of capital, goods, and services, is constituted by the
emergence of transnational corporations.
However, here a caveat is necessary. One has to remember that
globalization is confined to the "sunny side of the globe." It is the
globalization of markets within the framework of GATT, OECD, and to
some extent the EC. The rest of the world is either only loosely linked to
the world of globalizing economies or left out altogether. The EC is a
special case in this context. Certainly, the European Community constitutes
a prime example of transcending the parochial perspective of narrow
national markets. The completion of the internal market has created an
19. Bretton Woods Agreements, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
20. OECD was created as the reconstituted earlier Organization for European Economic
Cooperation and the Respective OECD Convention together with the Protocol on Revision of the OEEC
Convention. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Dec. 14,
1960, 888 U.N.T.S. 180; Convention for European Economic Co-Operation, April 16, 1948, 888 U.N.T.S.
142.
21. For a concise account of the role and function of GATT, OECD, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development [hereinafter IBRD] and IMF for development of the international
economic order into an at least partially globalizing one, see Ursula Heinz, Weltwirtschaftsordnung, in
HANDBUCH DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN, supra note 16, at 1080 passim.
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extensive zone without internal tariffs and other barriers to free trade. In
this sense, the EC could be perceived of as the result of "regional"
globalization if one could create such a paradoxical term. However, the EC,
particularly if the Maastricht Treaty22 enters into force, is more than a
"globalized market" and may eventually become something quite different.
Although there is not yet a clear consensus with regard to what the status
of the European Union is to be,23 it cannot be denied that the Union in
many ways has traits of a federal entity.24 Union citizenship, obligatory
judiciary, binding legislative powers by majority vote, and supremacy of EC
law over domestic law are the major characteristics of this new
supranational organization.25  A common foreign and security policy-if
it ever comes to be-added to the picture may force one to recognize that
the EC is, to say the least, an ambivalent example of what one may
understand by globalization. The "Fortress Europe" perception of the EC
by observers from the outside world is evidence of not totally unfounded
anxieties that the "globalized European market" may turn into a large but
domestic market.26
In summary, one may conclude that the international system is complex
and that it is necessary to approach the issue of globalization of law,
politics, and markets rather carefully in the light of its limited actual scope
and in the face of the various countervailing forces. Particularly, the
22. For the English text of the treaty, see Treaty on European Union, 32 I.L.M. 253.
23. The President of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, in a recent statement on the Maastricht
Treaty has observed, those favoring a federated European state entity could feel comfortable with the
Treaty and the goal of a European Union as provided for in the Treaty, but that those opposed to any
kind of federated Europe could find themselves encouraged by the Treaty as well. See Jacques Delors,
Entwicklungsperspektiven der Europdischen Gemeinschaft, B1/93 AUs POLITIK UND
ZEITGESCHICHTE-BEILAGE ZUR WOCHENZEIiNG DAS PARLAMENT 3, 4 (1993).
24. For a thorough discussion of the various options of the further development of the EC under
the Maastricht Treaty and the present legal and political status of the EC, see STAATWERDUNG EUROPAS?
OPTIONEN FOR EINE EUROPAISCHE UNION (Rudolf Wildenmann ed., 1991).
25. Union citizenship was created by Article B of the Maastricht Treaty and regulated in more
detail in Articles 8-8d of the EC Treaty revised. For a concise analysis of the other elements mentioned
in the text, see William J. Davey, European Integration: Reflections on Its Limits and Effects, I INDIANA
JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 185.
26. A related example is the recent introduction of new import tariffs on bananas from outside
the EC which contradicts the free trade attitude claimed by the EC. See Europiiische Zeitschrift flir
Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW), 75 (1993). For a discussion of the future political and trade posture of the EC
and the "Fortress Europe" issue, see Robert Zadra, Towards a European Identity, in TOWARDS A NEW
PARTNERSHIP-U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 55 (Nanette Gantz & John
Roper eds., 1993); James B. Steinberg, The Case for. a New Partnership, id. at 105; Juan de Luis,
Economic Aspects, id. at 147.
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ambivalent nature of the EC has to be realized. Yet, there is enough
evidence to allow discussion about globalization, i.e., the denationalization
of markets, relevant laws, and politics in the sense of interlacing peoples and
individuals for the sake of the common good, not the mere enhancement of
national interests. And in light of the evidence at hand, one is able to draw
upon the experiences in the various areas where globalization has been
realized beyond the mere adhortative level in assessing the impact of these
processes on domestic legal orders, politics, and markets.
II. STRATEGIES, MECHANISMS, AND INSTRUMENTS OF
GLOBALIZATION: EXPERIENCES FROM GATT, OECD, AND THE EC
A. The Means of Globalization
The spectrum of strategies, mechanisms, and instruments of
globalization extends from the establishment of international authorities with
ex ante "legislative" and ex post "repressive," liability enforcement
powers, 27 to consensual coordination of globalization efforts and to
decentralized market-oriented approaches. Basically, one may identify
preferences for these means of globalization with two opposing credos:
first, the belief in centralized planning or interventionist strategies and
mechanisms, and second, reliance on decentralized, liberal market oriented
strategies or mechanisms. The propagation and application of these two
basic approaches and a pragmatic mix of both means of globalization can
be identified on the different levels of globalization as well as in different
subject areas. But we can also observe that market oriented strategies,
mechanisms, and instruments tend to be applied where the globalization of
trade as a means of maximizing economic welfare for the greatest number
constitutes the policy goal.28 Intervention into the market is accepted only
when there is market failure. Five areas of market failure can be identified:
1) supply of public goods (public infrastructure such as parks, swimming
pools, etc.); 2) use of common resources (air, water, soil, etc.) in case of
27. For a discussion of the merits or disadvantages of ex ante harmonization by regulatory
interventions and ex post measures as well as the positive results of "institutional competition," see
HORST SIEBERT, THE NEW ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE IN EUROPE 15 (1991).
28. For a strong argument advocating moderate market-oriented strategy for the integration of
the EC-a potentially "Schumpeterian event, an institutional innovation," see id. at 13.
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negative externalities (abuse of common resources at the expense of the
community); 3) increasing returns to scale (increased production, reduced
prices leading to a natural monopoly); 4) lack of future markets because of
moral hazards; and 5) general problems of income distribution, social
security, etc., where political, not market, determination is considered
necessary.2 9 But where other considerations such as the protection of the
environment or underdevelopment dominate the determination of policy
goals, the choice of means seems to tend towards interventionist concepts.
Thus, international approaches to a restructuring of the world economic
order with a view to overcoming underdevelopment-the New International
Economic Order (NIEO)-were basically nonmarket oriented. 0
There are several reasons for this difference in choice and preference of
globalization means. First of all, the market model meets with a fair amount
of distrust when it comes to the problem of securing social values attached
to what traditionally is considered a "public good" in contrast to securing
"private goods."'" Free trade conditions are widely accepted as
advantageous to secure the provision of private goods for adequate prices,
but not for "public goods."
Similar considerations apply to "common resources" like clean air,
water, and soil, that are conceived of as nonmarketable goods because
access to them is traditionally considered to be free, i.e., they do not have
to be paid for.32 Free access to common resources, however, leads to
overexploitation33 and thereby to negative externalities, i.e., the costs of
overexploitation are burdening the taxpayer, not the beneficiaries, of
overexploitation. Central regulation to achieve the preservation and thereby
the further availability of common resources is considered the adequate
means. A second reason is that in view of the overwhelming dimension of
the perceived threats to common resources such as the environment, the
market-model approach would appear not to guarantee swift and effective
29. See R.W. BOADWAY & D.E. WILDASIN, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 31-43 passim (1979).
30. For this kind of approach, see Brun-Otto Bryde, Von der Notwendigkeit einer neuen
Weltwirtschaftsordnung, in NEUORDNUNG DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT 29 (Brun-Otto Bryde et al. eds., 1986);
for a market-oriented approach in the same context, see, Thomas Oppermann, Uber die Grundlagen der
heutigen Weltwirtschaftsordnung, in id. at 11.
31. For a pertinent discussion of the notions of "public" and "private" goods in the context of
environmental policies, see Gerhard Prosi, Statische und dynamische Effizienz der Umweltpolitik, 66
BAYERISCHES LANDWIRTSCHAFTLICHES JAHRBUCH 259 (1989).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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redress; the decentralized decision-making process of the market is believed
to be unable to provide for the needed uniformity of concerted efforts
necessary to cope with transborder and, even more so, global threats of the
destruction of common resources. These arguments contend that in the area
of common resources there is, per definitionem, no market mechanism which
could be set to work. However, from the point of view of pure economic
theory, this is false.34 According to one school of thought, the fallacy of
considering common resources as untradeable lies in the fact that it is not
the public good, e.g., clean air, which is at issue, but the right to use it.
This right, once allocated to a user for an adequate price, becomes a private
good and the costs for it become "internalized."35  Under conditions of
market competition, the user of a common resource comes under pressure
to reduce the amount of internalized cost, i.e., to reduce the use of the
resource. This reduction of the use of the common resource turns into a
reduction of, for instance, air pollution. As an additional advantage, the user
provides for technological innovation as a means of reducing the costs for
the use of a common resource-a typical achievement of the laws of the
market.36 Another, probably more realistic, school of thought does not
deny the necessity of certain regulatory measures but is inclined to accept
a decentralized scheme of regulation.37
For instance, if states are left free to set their own standards of
environmental protection, a process of "institutional" competition would
still ensue. Although under the principle of origin, goods with lower
environmental quality remain freely tradeable, the level of environmental
standards will still improve because, given the acceptance of an improved
environment as a high social value, the goods conforming to higher
standards of environmental quality will be more competitive.38 Rigid
central ex ante regulations, on the other hand, will not provide for incentives
to strive for improved environmental standards and respective innovative
technology. 39 But even more importantly, in an international environment
34. See SIEBERT, supra note 27, at 32, who discusses a market oriented approach to a European
environmental policy that is based on the concept of institutional competition; see also Prosi, supra note
31, passim.
35. See Prosi, supra note 31, at 260-61.
36. Id. at 269.
37. For a clear example on point, see SIEBERT, supra note 27, at 32.
38. Id. at 32.
39. Prosi, supra note 31, at 269.
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lacking a central legislative authority, the achievement of maximum or
optimum regulations does not seem a realistic assumption.
The theoretical dispute over the validity of these and similar strategies
cannot be pursued here any further. Instead, experiences at the different
levels and subject areas of globalization processes will be considered: first,
the globalization of markets in the area of free trade; second, the strategies
and instruments used by international organizations like the GATT and the
OECD, on one hand, and the EC, on the other.
B. Globalizing Markets in the Free Trade Area
1. The Case of GATT
Viewed from the perspective of the original concept of GATT, this
treaty embodies the core principles of liberal market theory.40 The "most
favored nation" principle, the reduction of customs tariffs, the principle of
nondiscrimination, and removal of nontariff trade barriers are to be
implemented with the ultimate goal of increasing the world trade volume,
raising the standard of living, and providing for full employment.4' The
scope of GATT, that applies de jure to well over 100 states and de facto to
roughly another 30 states, is restricted to trade in goods. Services and
movement of capital are not covered by the Agreement, and negotiations on
questions of transborder services are carried out formally outside the
GATT.42 But even recognizing these limitations on the scope of GATT,
its global reach is without question. This point is also borne out by recent
trade statistics which show that about eighty-five percent of world trade
takes place within the realm of GATT.43
The globalization of markets by a basically deregulatory approach in the
fields of customs tariffs, nontariff trade barriers, and nondiscrimination has,
however, been modified over the decades in favor of strengthening the
global reach of GATT. Although not in conformity with the basic market
philosophy of GATT, exceptions to the "most favored nation" principle have
40. For a summary description of the basic GATT principles, see Jaenicke, supra note 16, at 22-
6; Benedek, supra note 16, at 203-07.
41. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, preamble 1 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
42. Benedek, supra note 16, at 205.
43. Id. at 202; Oppermann, supra note 30, at 13, (speaks of only 80 percent).
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been granted for member states entering customs unions, free trade areas, or
regional arrangements of a similar kind but falling short of the strict regimes
of the former." Parties to such arrangements are not obliged to extend the
internal advantages to third states. Another exception to the "most favored
nation" principle is the acceptance of preferential treatment, e.g., for
underdeveloped countries.'
These regulatory deviations from the pure free market philosophy are
being justified by reason of their directly beneficial effects upon the
countries or regions concerned and their indirect promotion of world trade
at large by strengthening the economies of the privileged states. 6 It may
be noted here, however, that the establishment of the EC did not meet with
the unanimous consensus of the GATT community. It was not formally
privileged under the exception to the most favored nation principle
mentioned before. GATT members only took de facto notice of the EC,
which has not become a member of GATT. In practice, however, the EC
represents its member states in the GATT decision-making process. 4
Other deviations from the free market concept are temporarily allowed under
the so-called "escape clause ' 48-a bow to the principle of sovereignty in
that states are accorded the right in cases of necessity to give priority to
national interests over GATT obligations.49 The general regulatory inroads
made on the free market concept by reason of environmental concerns will
be dealt with in the next subsection. 0
2. The Case of the OECD
The OECD presents a similar picture. Its policies, or strategies, are
defined in Article 1 of the OECD Convention. According to this provision,
OECD's policies are designed to "achieve the highest sustainable economic
44. For more details, see Jaenicke, supra note 16, at 23; Benedek, supra note 16, at 206.
45. These preferences are granted by the industrialized countries under the Generalized System
of Preferences. See Jaenicke, supra note 16, at 23; Benedek, supra note 16, at 206.
46. With regard to this preferential treatment see Oppermann, supra note 30, at 18, 19.
Oppermann takes a positive view of the underlying policy determination but emphasizes that the
preferential treatment should be seen as a temporary exception to the basic market-oriented philosophy
of GATT, not as a structural change toward a new international economic order.
47. See Benedek, supra note 16, at 202, 206; Jaenicke, supra note 16, at 20.
48. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XIX, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
49. See Jaenicke, supra note 16, at 23.
50. See infra part H.C.
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growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member
countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the
development of the world economy."'" Its global aspirations are
particularly evident from the wording of Article 1, paragraphs b and c, that
require the OECD's policies "to contribute to sound economic expansion in
member as well as non-member [sic] countries in the process of
development" and "to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a
multilateral, nondiscriminatory basis in accordance with international
obligations." In implementing these policies the OECD has engaged in a
sweeping program of liberalizing trade by dismantling quantitative
restrictions, but it has also included the liberalization of capital movements
and invisible transactions.52 A major focus of the OECD's activities has
been to mitigate adverse effects on member and nonmember states'
economies and free trade on account of the energy (oil) crisis.53 Thus the
OECD's scope of activities ratione materiae is broader than that of GATT,
but it is more limited than GATT ratione personae. It comprises nineteen
Northern, Western and Southern European countries and five non-European
countries (the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand).54
The OECD thus comprises the core of the industrialized countries which
also form the backbone of industrialized countries in GATT. The EC is not
formally a member of the OECD, but together with EFTA participates in the
work of the OECD on the basis of an express provision of the OECD
Convention (Article 13), Supplementary Protocol Number 1 to the
Convention (EC) and by a Ministerial Resolution (EFTA). The
characteristic feature of OECD's work is that it is predominantly based on
consensual coordination of the sovereign member and nonmember states'
policies. Lawmaking and strict enforcement by the organization have played
a decreasing role.55  Yet the achievements in the field of trade
liberalization have been many. It is no exaggeration that the work of OECD
has made a considerable contribution to the globalization of markets. The
51. Organization for European Economic Cooperation, December 14, 1960, art. 1, 1 a, 888
U.N.T.S. 180, 183.
52. Id. at 183; see also Hugo J. Hahn, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, at 214, 214-15.
53. Hahn, supra note 52, at 218.
54. Id. at 214.
55. Id. at 221.
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special issue of trade and the environment under the auspices of the OECD
will be treated below.f
6
3. The Case of the EC
The overall goal of the European Community is a high degree of
economic and ultimately political integration. The preamble and Article 2
of the EEC treaty57 contain a rather long list of goals and tasks set for the
organization. The Single European Act" and the Maastricht Treaty59
have added even more tasks and competences, for that matter, all aiming at
the dynamic integration of the member states. Because of the dynamics
built into the integration process, the EC has potentially comprehensive
jurisdiction over all areas of economic, social, and cultural activities within
the EC territory.6°
The overall aims for establishing first, the common, and second, the
internal, market, are specified in the so-called "four freedoms." These four
freedoms are the freedom of movement of goods, services, persons, and
capital. Also, in the provisions on the removal of customs barriers, free
competition, and the observance of nondiscrimination are overriding
principles applicable in the process of implementation of the other basic
goals. The complex goals and principles of the EC, like those of the GATT
and the OECD, again constitute the core credo of a market-oriented strategy.
But this complex of goals and principles is much larger in scope than that
of the other organizations, or it may even be unlimited in scope.
The process of implementation of the four freedoms may properly be
called one of "globalization" in a figurative sense; the formerly domestic
markets are becoming global ratione personae and materiae. The EC has
also engaged in enhancing the globalization of markets-much in line with
GATT and OECD-in that it has opened the EC market to third states, at
least to a certain extent. The several Lom6 Conventions6 have granted
56. See infra part II.C.2.
57. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 15;
for the text as amended until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty see Single European Act 1987 O.J. (L
169) 30.
58. Single European Act, February 17-28, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 506.
59. Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247.
60. See Davey, supra note 25.
61. European Economic Community-African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Convention of
Lom6, February 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 595 [hereinafter Lom6 I]; European Economic Community-African,
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preferential treatment to former dependent areas of member states. Recent
agreements with former member states of COMECON, e.g., Poland, the
Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary, have granted these states access
to the EC market.62 Although not in line with pure market theory, these
accords and agreements tend to strengthen the future full participation of
these countries in a global market-universal or regional. The policy of
globalization is also followed in the EC by the establishment of the
European Economic Area,63 i.e., the extension of most of the liberal trade
regime of the EC to the EFTA area except for Switzerland.'
However, the EC did not solely rely on the mechanisms of a liberalized
market in achieving the goals of the Community. It used its broad
legislative regulatory powers, on the one hand, to enhance and accelerate the
harmonization of the laws within the EC, not leaving it to "institutional
•• "65 teo
competition. On the other hand, it legislated in order to set common
standards to secure unimpaired conditions of free competition or to further
technological development in the EC as, for instance, in the area of
telecommunications" and in other fields. While legislative intervention
aimed at maintaining fair conditions for competition is clearly in line with
modem market theories, regulations (mainly directives, but also programs
of subsidies) to further the technological or other industrial capabilities of
the EC are clearly of a central authority-backed, interventionist nature.67
A complete deviation from the principles of market-oriented
globalization of the domestic markets of the member states has taken place
in the area of agriculture. The agricultural "market" is actually a nonmarket
system that is highly regulated. It is neither globalized nor based on the
Carribean and Pacific Countries Convention of Lom6, October 31, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 327 [hereinafter Lom6
II]; European Economic Community-African, Carribean and Pacific Countries Convention of Lom6,
December 8, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 571 [hereinafter Lom6 III].
62. For the text of these agreements which have entered into force as of March 1, 1992, see 1992
O.J. (L 114, 115, 116) 1 etseq.
63. Accord sur I'Espace Economique Europ6en, Revue Suisse de Droit International et Europen
(R.S.D.I.E.) 339-424 (1992).
64. See Archiv der Gegenwart (AdG), 37394 A (1992).
65. On "institutional competition" as a means of harmonization of the legal orders of the EC
members see SIEBERT, supra note 27, at 15.
66. See Council Directive 89/552, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23; Draft Directive on the Adoption of
Standards for Satellite Broadcasting of Television Signals, COM(91)242; see also Council Directive
86/529, 1986 O.J. (L 311) 28; Cate, supra note 9.
67. The example of the EC measures adopted to introduce and promote the MAC/HDTV
standard is telling in this regard. See supra note 66.
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principles of free-market theory. It is a "rent-seeking" and protectionist
subsystem of the EC.68 The regulatory powers have also been extensively
used in the case of environmental protection-an area to be covered further
below.69
The overall picture of the process of globalization within the framework
of the EC shows that both the mechanisms of a free market and the
instruments of central regulation, backed by central enforcement authorities
(Commission and Court), have been applied. In this regard, the EC differs
from the other organizations mentioned, particularly from the OECD, in the
way it has strived for the globalization of intracommunity commerce. In
some areas it has acted more like an emerging domestic market than an
open globalizing one. On the other hand, the steps taken to widen the scope
of the EC market with regard to developing countries, some former Socialist
countries and to EFTA, is evidence of the globalizing thrust of the EC
enterprise.
C. Globalization of Markets and Environmental Protection
In the first section of this paper, it was pointed out that problems of
genuinely global dimension have emerged in the field of environmental
protection. The international community has come to realize that the abuse
of the natural recources of the globe (the atmosphere, air, water, soil, the
rain forests, and the living resources, to name but the most important
elements of the environment) has reached a level where protective activities
by individual States are not commensurate with the existential threats to the
survival of "Spaceship Earth." Production and consumption of goods
necessarily draw on the natural resources and thus have a negative effect on
the environment. 70 This is of no concern as long as these resources are
amply available or are renewable. But once these resources, particularly
fresh air and clean water, become scarce because of exploitation, production
of, trade with, and consumption of these goods becomes a matter of public
concern. Exploitation of common resources results from the fact that their
68. See Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, Umweltschutz und Welthandelsordnung im GA7, OECD- und
EWG-Rahmen, 47 EUROPA ARCHLY 257, 258.
69. See infra part II.C.3.
70. See Petersmann, supra note 68, at 257.
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use traditionally has been considered to be necessarily free.7 ' Common
resources, as mentioned above, are not held to be marketable goods. In
principle, it is possible to privatize their use and thereby subject them to the
laws of the market, i.e., to set an adequate price for their use and thus
internalize the costs at the producer or consumer level. However, practice
shows that for whatever reasons, states as well as the international
community at large tend to intervene in the market and bring protectionist
regulation to bear. These measures are protectionist in a double sense:
domestic environmental measures are used literally to protect the
environment, but they are sometimes also used as unilateral measures to
enforce national standards of environmental protection on third states to the
effect that trade with those third states may be impaired in favor of domestic
goods.72 In other words, domestic environmental regulations can and often
do collide with the laws of a free market. Yet economic theory teaches us
that discriminatory domestic protective measures, even for the high goal of
environmental protection as a rule do not result in optimum solutions.73
Based on the premise that environmental protection and international
commerce are not necessarily antagonistic goals,74 GATT, OECD, and the
EC have tried to work out regulatory regimes for their respective realms
either by a trial-and-error settlement of the conflicting interests75 or by
relevant laws or conventions. 76  The principal instruments and regulatory
principles applied are the "polluter pays" principle and the imposition of
nondiscriminatory charges, taxes, and various economic incentives to induce
producers and consumers to abide by environmental standards and to utilize
innovative technology to reduce the use of scarce natural resources.77
71. See Prosi, supra note 31, at 259.
72. On environmental protection and "green protectionism," see Petersmann, supra note 68, at
258 et seq.; with regard to the same phenomenon in GATT, see Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, International
Trade Law and International Environmental Law, 27 J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1993, at 43, 78.
73. See Petersmann, supra note 68, at 258.
74. See Prosi, supra note 31, at 272.
75. See Petersmann, supra note 68, at 262.
76. With regard to the EC, see Ludwig Krimer, Community Environmental Law-Towards a
Systematic Approach, II Yearbook of European Law 151 (1991). The author points to some 200 legal
instruments, while the European Parliament refers to 445 legislative acts, 196 directives, 40 regulations,
150 decisions, and 14 recommendations and resolutions. See also EP O.J. 1991 C 183/297; Krdmer,
supra at 151 n.l.
77. On these instruments and principles, see Petersmann, supra note 68, at 257; Petersmann,
International Trade Law and Environmental Law, supra note 72, passim; see also Eliza Patterson, GA 77
and the Environment-Rules Changes to Minimize Adverse Trade and Environmental Effects, 26 J.
WORLD TRADE 1992, at 99; James H. Mathis, Trade Related Environmental Measures in the GATT,
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1. The Case of GAYT
Based on a number of rulings rendered in dispute settlement
proceedings, the GATT has established a clear distinction between
permissible national environmental regulations, (nonprotectionist or
nondiscriminatory unilateral measures) and impermissible regulations
(protectionist discriminatory measures).78 The essence of these rulings is
that as long as national environmental protection measures (penalties,
charges, taxes, etc.) are applied equally to domestic and imported goods,
such measures are not considered to impede free trade. The legal basis for
these rulings is Article III of GATT. The rationale of the rulings in related
cases, e.g., the US/Mexico Tuna case,79 the US/Canada Herring case, ° the
EC, Canada, Mexico/US Super Fund Act case,"' has also been applied to
the problem of reconciling implementation of the 170 or so conventions on
environmental protection concluded outside the GATT. 2 The goals
pursued by these conventions were held by the GATT to be beneficial for
both the exporting and the importing country. As long as the obligations
ensuing from the conventions are realized in a nondiscriminatory way and
the means and ends are proportionate, respective measures are deemed to be
compatible with the GATT.83  Furthermore, GATT encouraged mutual
recognition of technical standards of equivalent efficiency. Subsidies for
strictly environmental purposes were accepted as permissible. Thus GATT
has set an example of reconciling environmental concerns with the principles
of free trade, at least in principle, and has added a dimension of global
environmental responsibility to its global aspirations in the field of
commerce.
LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1991/2, at 37; Prosi, supra note 31, at 261-63; SIEBERT, supra
note 27, at 32 (who in addition emphasizes the country of origin principle).
78. See Petersmann, supra note 68, at 258 et seq.
79. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1598 (1991); for an analysis of
the case see Carol J. Beyers, The US/Mexico Tuna Embargo Dispute: A Case Study of the GATT and
Environmental Progress, 16 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRADE, 229 (1992).
80. Panel report adopted March 22, 1988, GATT, 35 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents
(BISD), June 1989, S/98 et seq.
81. Report adopted June 17, 1987, GATT, 34 BISD, June 1988, S/1 36 et seq.
82. See Petersmann, supra note 68, at 262.
83. See Petersmann, supra note 68, at 258.
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2. The Case of OECD
The OECD has followed basically the same policies. After lengthy
deliberations, in 1991 the OECD Council of Ministers adopted a Joint
Report on Commerce and Development, which recommended a revision of
the 1972 Guidelines for the Protection of the Environment and-an Open
Trade System." OECD relies on the principles of "polluter pays" and
environmental damage prevention, charges, taxes, and incentives to further
the cause of environmental protection and at the same time to preserve an
open market. But it also holds against protectionist measures intended to
make up for disadvantages ensuing from particularly high environmental
standards that impair competitiveness, a course not quite in line with a pure
environmental stance since it "punishes" states upholding particularly high
standards of environmental protection.
3. The Case of the EC
In the field of environmental protection the EC faces the same basic
problems of reconciling environmental goals and free trade aspirations as do
the GATT and the OECD. However, the EC's approach to the problem has
been (and still is) a very different one. In every sense of the word, the
global scope of environmental threats is evidently perceived as being so
overwhelming that neither pure market mechanisms, such as competition
over the environmentally best products fueled by consumer preferences, nor
national regulation as the basis for "institutional" competition between the
different legal systems, is considered adequate to cope with the
environmental threat effectively. A rather illuminating statement of the
regulatory credo of the EC is found in a recent article by a lawyer of the
Commission of the EC, who unequivocally states:
There are transnational environmental problems. Pollution of the
Atlantic Ocean, the North, the Baltic, or the Mediterranean Seas, air
pollution, the disappearance of fauna and flora species, and or other
environmental problems cannot be resolved by national or regional
activity alone. International conventions are not fully enforced; they
84. Id. at 264-65.
85. Id. at 264.
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lack the necessary legal authority on the one hand and effective
enforcement procedures on the other.8 6
One could hardly imagine a more appropriate paraphrase of the EC's
philosophy (which does not only apply to the environment): globalization
the EC way is the only effective means to solve imminent problems. In the
environmental field, international and national approaches are dismissed, and
so are economic instruments such as the "polluter pays" principle. Although
referred to in the Treaty in one instance (Article 130r, paragraph 2), "the
principle [as it] stands at present . . . is, without concrete measures
indicating what shall be paid for, a political guideline." 7  Economic
instruments may be applied by the Member States, and they encouraged to
do so, but these instruments are of no concern to the EC as such."
The body of environmental law is contained in the Treaty,89 in
international conventions to which the EC is a party, and in a host of
secondary laws (regulations and directives). 90 As EC law, these rules and
regulations take precedence over national law of the Member States,9 but
national law is allowed to set higher standards of environmental protection
as long as these are compatible with the Treaty,92 i.e., as long as the
principles of nondiscrimination and free trade are observed. However, the
free trade principle has been handled restrictively by the ECJ in favor of
environmental protection. 93  The ECJ found the Danish national law
restricting the import of nonreturnable containers (bottles in this case) to
constitute a trade impediment under Article 30. Yet, the Court upheld the
Danish ban on such bottles because of overriding environmental concerns,
86. Krtimer, supra note 76, at 151 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 162.
88. On the foregoing, see id. at 161-62.
89. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 57.
90. See Krtmer, supra note 76, at 153, who emphasizes those areas of EC activity which, in the
understanding of globalization assumed in this paper, show a distinct global dimension.
91. In this respect EC environmental law follows the general principles governing the
relationship between EC law and domestic law as enunciated by the ECJ in a leading case, Case 6/64,
Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585 [hereinafter Costa]; see also Krdmer, supra note 76, at 163.
92. Setting higher domestic standards, as a rule, requires authorization by Community legislation,
which it normally provides. In exceptional cases more stringent domestic standards may also be
promulgated without prior authorization provided that they are compatible with the higher EC law. See
Krimer, supra note 76, at 164.
93. See Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607 [hereinafter Danish Bottle
Case]; see also Petersmann, supra note 68, at 265-66.
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and because the measure in itself was nondiscriminatory, proportionate, and
not arbitrary.94
As in the case of the geographic extension of the EC's trade laws to
nonmember states in the cause of globalization, the EC's environmental laws
aim at globalization in two ways. They are aimed not only at preventing
and reducing environmental damages within the EC, but they are also
directed towards global goals like stopping the depletion of the ozone layer
and other environmental hazards of global dimensions. 95 Furthermore, EC
law provides the possibility for individuals to resort to national courts and
ultimately to the European Court of Justice (for instance, via Article 177)
in cases where directives are not properly transposed or not complied with
otherwise.96 Thus, individuals and other economic agents are directly
involved in the enforcement of environmental rules and standards
irrespective of national borders and national status. This is a major
difference from the GATT system, that gives primary consideration to
producer interests in a rather mercantilist manner, while the EC recognizes
that the principles of free trade and environmental protection create rights
for consumers and EC market citizens which have to be protected by the
national courts and by the ECJ if called upon by the national courts under
Article 177 of the EC Treaty. The EC deals with the environmental
problems predominantly in a regulatory way. The role of the domestic legal
orders and domestic economic approaches to environmental protection are
largely reduced to a supplementary role. The EC strongly believes in central
lawmaking and central enforcement by the authority of the Commission and
ultimately the ECJ. The principles of free trade, although also upheld in
principle in the field of environmental protection, have suffered major
modifications, environmental protection having been given priority in a
number of major cases.97 This fact certainly has ramifications for the
external commercial relations of the EC but also for the national economic
orders of the Member States. From this perspective, the EC is globalizing
in the environmental field internally as well, but with the further result of
94. See Petersmann, supra note 68, at 266.
95. See Kr5mer, supra note 76, at 153.
96. On enforcement of EC environmental law, particularly on rights of individuals to participate
in the enforcement process, see Krimer, supra note 76, at 168.
97. For a conspicuous example, see Danish Bottle Case, supra note 93.
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behaving more like an emerging large domestic market of a federal entity
than as a globalizing agent of an open, free, world market.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT PROCESSES OF GLOBALIZATION
FOR DOMESTIC LAW AND POLICY CHOICES.
Processes of globalization have taken place and are still in progress.
The strategies, mechanisms, and instruments applied on the different levels
of globalization are market oriented to different degrees, mainly depending
on the subject area being globalized and on the political feasibility of
replacing market-induced strategies of globalization by central lawmaking
and enforcement. From the preceding overview and analysis of the
experiences of GATT, OECD, and the EC it seems quite obvious that on all
levels but the EC level a mix of market-oriented strategies and consensual
coordination of efforts with some regulatory/interventionist touches
dominates. While this is also true with regard to the EC in the area of
trade, a heavy reliance on the regulatory approach can be observed in the
area of the protection of the environment with clear repercussions for the
principles of free trade and their implementation EC-wide and beyond, as
well as domestically. Before examining the implications of these general
findings for preferences of policy choices, the purely legal implications of
the two basic approaches to globalization for the domestic law of the states
concerned shall be considered.
A. Effects of Globalization of Laws on Domestic Law
The GATT and OECD approaches, hereafter referred to as the
international model, rely on the globalization, i.e., harmonization and
denationalization of the domestic legal orders, through international
agreements that oblige the states to transpose the international legal
obligations into domestic law. This means that the actual process of
globalization is left to the sovereign decision-making authority of the states
or their respective legal provisions on the relationship between international
law and the domestic legal order.9" In addition, the globalization is left to
98. On this approach according to the dualist concept of the relationship between international
and domestic law, see DAHM, DELBROCK & WOLFRUM, supra note 2, at 98; Partsch, International Law
and Municipal Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al.
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the market agents whose commercial practices under the international regime
mold the emerging global order. In particular, international arbitral dispute
settlements under the terms of the international and/or nationalized rules of
international commerce (GATT rules, OECD rules, UNCITRAL, Codes of
Conduct, etc.) and environmental protection contribute to the growth of a
global lex mercatoria that is mainly informed by the interests and needs of
the actual participants in the economic transactions.99 Thus, there is no
immediate effect on the domestic law by international rule making and
standard setting under the auspices of the international model. However, the
process of globalization is less assured, since state sovereignty remains an
incalculable intervening variable.
Under the EC or supranational model, the effect of globalizing
lawmaking is an immediate one, in line with a monistic approach to the
relationship between international/supranational and domestic law. 00 The
principle of the supremacy of EC law means that domestic law is set aside
or, in the case of directives, domestic lawmaking is predetermined by the
binding goals set by the directives. Thus, there is, with regard to the goals,
no room for discretion on the part of the domestic lawmakers. The
immediate effect of the supranational law as the globalizing agent is
independent of the sovereign will of the Member States and is backed up by
the enforcement powers of the ECJ. Of course, the picture drawn in the
preceding considerations is rather idealistic, because there is some influence
by the Member States on these immediate effects of EC lawmaking as a tool
of globalization. Namely, the lawmaking ultimately rests on the consent of
the Member States' representatives to the Council of Ministers. This
influence is mitigated, however, once again by the fact that according to the
provisions of the Single European Act (for instance, Article 100a), decisions
can be made by majority vote. In essence, the harmonization or
eds., 1987).
99. See Ernst A. Krmer, Globalisierung der Wirtschaft-Internationalisierung des Privaten
Wirtschaftsrechts, OSTERREICHISCHES BANKARCHIV (OBA) 9/91, at 621 et seq., pointing out the various
methods of unifying domestic law; on the emerging new lex mercatoria, id., at 625 with further
references.
100. The relationship between the law of supranational organizations such as the EC and the
internal law of the member states, because such organizations and their respective law are considered to
be of a different kind than international law, must be recognized to also be based on international treaty
law, the status of which within the internal legal order of the parties to the founding treaty has to be
determined, and this is done so, in the case of the EC, along the lines of a monistic approach: at least
part of the law of the EC is directly applicable in the Member States. See Costa, supra note 91, at 585.
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globalization-denationalization of the market, law, and politics within the EC
is a swift and effective process, particularly in the area of environmental
protection. But it is unique in terms of the necessary political preparedness
needed by the Member States to accept the supranational authority wielded
by the EC.
B. Policy Choices for Globalization
When it comes to the question of choices, i.e., what course of action is
preferable, the supranational approach or the international model, a number
of political decisions must be made. First, it has to be decided that
globalization is a desirable end. Considering the urgency of resolving the
vexing problems mentioned in the first part of this paper, it appears that a
global approach to the serious world problems of our time is without real
alternatives. Second, it has to be decided which means of achieving the
necessary degree of globalization of problem perception and of problem-
solving capabilities are preferable. Are slightly modified market-oriented
strategies preferable over central interventionist ones? The answer is
difficult. There are persuasive arguments, particularly on the part of
economic theory, in favor of a modified market approach. Reliance on ex
ante central lawmaking has to rely on the assumption that the central
authorities, the politicians, possess better quality, insight, and knowledge to
legislate properly or to reach better solutions than the decentralized market
process would render. Economic theory provides serious evidence that
central regulation in the long run arrives at less than pareto-optimal solutions
despite possible short-term higher efficiency."1
Second, the supranational approach, with its inherent inclination towards
using ex ante regulation as the tool of globalization, presupposes a degree
of political homogeneity and basic consensus that is not the rule in the
international system at large. Thus, it seems a tenable position that in the
long run a market-oriented approach along the lines of what is called in
Europe, particularly in Germany, the social-ecological market economy, is
the best choice. But this is so only if certain political conditions are met.
First, states have to be ready to transpose international obligations faithfully
into the domestic legal orders. Second, states have to forego the option of
101. See BOADWAY & WILDASIN, supra note 29, at 5.
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unilateralism, whether with regard for protectionist temptations or
overzealous goals of enforcing free trade or standards of environmental
protection beyond their domestic realms. Third, states have to gear their
domestic legal orders to a swift and effective reception of the norms of
international, or rather, of the emerging, global law, and particularly courts
must be bound to have due regard for the norms of international/global law.
Fourth, states have to ensure that globalization of markets, law, and politics
becomes effective for societies and individuals at large, not only for specific
market agents.
In order to be met, the latter condition probably requires the most
important and difficult adaptation of the domestic legal order and domestic
politics because it demands nothing less than an exchange of the basic
paradigms of traditionally market-oriented (capitalist, if one wants to call it
that) societies. To think and act globally means to focus on societies as a
whole, not some powerful interest groups. A lasting cooperative relationship
between the United States and the EC (and Japan as well) seems to depend
on whether these powerful actors in the emerging global order will be able
to achieve this resetting of the leading paradigms of their respective value
systems. Whether the EC will really become "Fortress Europe," as has been
suggested by some political observers, is an open question. Whether the
United States will grow into the role of a truly global leader rather than
remaining an international hegemonic power (wholesome as the existence
of at least one powerful pillar of the international system actually is) is a
question just as open.
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